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This text attempts to develop a sound justification 
for Plato’s pedagogical use of myth in the dia-
logues. In particular, I seek to resolve a seeming 
contradiction: why Plato personally made use of 
myths in spite of his many statements that seem to 
contradict such a pedagogical approach, especially 
his edict that poets and myth-makers be banished 
from his republic for the danger their works pose 
to the attainment of true philosophical wisdom. An 
analysis of the centrality of myths to the dialogues 
is carried out, followed by a discussion of the place 
of muthos in its Ionian historical context. This es-
tablishes the basis for resolving the contradiction 
through the division of muthos into two distinct 
modes: the fantastic and the eikastic.  
Key words: Myth; Plato’s Republic; Banishing of 
Poets.
En este artículo se intenta desarrollar una justifica-
ción del uso pedagógico que hace Platón del mito 
en sus diálogos. En particular, trato de resolver una 
aparente contradicción: ¿por qué Platón hace uso 
de mitos, a pesar de sus numerosas declaraciones 
que parecen contradecir este enfoque pedagógico, 
especialmente cuando destierra a los poetas y a 
los escritores de mitos de su república por el pe-
ligro que sus obras representan para el logro de 
la verdadera sabiduría filosófica? Se efectuará un 
análisis sobre la importancia de los mitos en los 
diálogos, y, después, se ubicará el uso del muthos 
en su contexto histórico jónico. Con ello se esta-
blece la base para resolver la contradicción a través 
de la división del muthos en dos tipos distintos: el 
fantástico y el icástico.
Palabras clave: Mito; República de Platón; Des-
tierro de poetas.
The works of Plato are unique among ancient philosophers in that Plato 
utilizes an atypical narrative form, the dialogue, in order to convey philo-
sophical truths, rather than relying purely on logos, or argumentative ap-
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peals to reason. Indeed, one can regard many of Plato’s writings as a form 
of «philosophical fiction», constructed narratives in which the interactions 
between imagined characters serve to illuminate some central truth by means 
of example rather than direct logical explication. Indeed, in many of Plato’s 
most famous dialogues, he relies not only on the construction of fictional 
scenarios involving realistic Athenian characters, but on appeals to Greek 
mythology and poetry, in order to get his point across. Plato’s use of muthos 
in the context of logos has been the subject of much scholarly inquiry, and it 
has often been cited that Plato regarded myths as possessing some degree of 
pedagogical merit. However, this explanation is, in itself, somewhat lacking 
when taken in the context of the entire body of Plato’s works. This is because 
Plato himself, on numerous occasions, speaks out against the allegorical use 
of myth as a means of enhancing philosophical understanding and, famously, 
calls for the banishing of all poets and myth-makers from his utopian republic 
on the grounds that their works are obstructive to a legitimate understand-
ing of noble philosophical truths. Any adequate justification of Plato’s use 
of myth, then, must resolve these apparent contradictions. Beginning with 
an examination of some of the most prominent uses of myth in the Platonic 
dialogues as well as the contemporary historic context for the division of 
muthos and logos, this text will develop a potential justification for Plato’s 
pedagogical use of myth that resolves the seeming contradictions of the Re-
public via an appeal to the dichotomous division of myth into fantastic and 
eikastic components in an earlier dialogue, the Sophist.
i. mytH in tHe diaLogues 
The presence of mythological allusions, and later mythological inventions, in 
the dialogues of Plato suggests that the author possesses an approving criti-
cal stance towards mythology. Indeed, myths or at least mythological motifs 
form a central component of many of his most popular works. This is a view 
held by the majority of scholars who look at the works of Plato, regardless of 
their opinion of the dialectical merit of the use of myth. In his now famous 
critique of Plato’s use of myth, Edelstein writes that myths «seem to occupy 
a fixed and allotted place within the cosmos of his philosophy» (Edelstein 
1949, p. 463). In other words, it seems plain to most scholars that the use 
of myth in Plato’s work is not incidental, but rather a carefully determined 
decision; the mythological content is not just there, but there for a reason. In 
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most cases, Plato’s inclusion of a myth is entirely essential to the respective 
dialogue’s thematic intent; one often cannot discern the «meaning» of a given 
dialogue without considering it in the context of the mythological motif in 
which Plato has situated it. 
One key case in which myth informs Plato’s thematic intent is in the Eu-
thyphro. The central question of this dialogue, the question of what consti-
tutes true piety, is not directly handled in an abstract discussion, but rather 
situated in the concrete context of the experiences of Socrates and Euthyphro. 
Meeting Socrates at court rather than in his usual place in the Athenian mar-
ket, Euthyphro asks after Socrates’ business and is told of the charges of 
impiety that Meletus had laid against him. In turn, Socrates is told of Euthy-
phro’s business: he has come to court as a seer to give his opinion on the 
matter of a local death, and is prepared to level accusations against his own 
father, because he considers this the proper course of action in spite of the 
familial discord to which it will expose him. Socrates appeals to several in-
stances of Greek mythology in order to provide a context through which both 
his and Euthyphro’s situations can be better understood: Zeus’ chaining up 
his father Cronus, as well as Cronus’ castrating his own father Uranus (Eu-
thyphro 6a173). In this case, Plato’s use of mythology serves a clear textual 
purpose: it not only functions as an allusion to Euthyphro’s plans to condemn 
his own father, but calls into question the very concept of piety as understood 
by the Athenian courts; indeed, there is a great deal of hypocrisy, as Socrates 
points out, in the court’s attitudes towards the actions of Zeus and Cronus, 
and their attitude towards his own actions (Billingsley 1991, p. 14). 
Elsewhere, in the Phaedrus, the tendency for Plato to rely upon mythol-
ogy for thematic emphasis becomes even more pronounced. Here, Socrates 
again makes an appeal to myth in order to illuminate a point about the role 
of pragmatism in human sexual and romantic relationships. The idea of prag-
matic rationality as opposed to «seductive but ultimately empty» passions is 
clearly common to many of Plato’s works (Kluge 2010, p. 347). What is in-
teresting in the Phaedrus is the fact that Socrates employs a myth in order to 
convey this common theme rather than relying purely upon logical argument. 
In doing so, it can be said that Socrates successfully provides the context by 
which to unify the two otherwise disparate topics of the Phaedrus, meta-
physical truth and the experience of love, into a cohesive thematic whole 
(Phaedrus 246a-256e). In other words, Plato has relied on myth rather than 
logic for a pedagogical and aesthetic purpose, a «means of reconciling truth 
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and beauty», a feat which is central to one’s full thematic understanding of 
the dialogue as a whole (Kluge 2010, p. 347). 
To further examine this, one might look at the presented dichotomy in 
greater detail. On the one hand, one is presented with the usual Platonic as-
sertion that the pursuit of truth and the pursuit of the passions are set at odds 
to one another; that philosophy, reason, and substance lie on one path, and 
poetry, passion, and ephemeral beauty on another. It is the use of the myth in 
this context, however, that demonstrates Socrates’, and by extension, Plato’s 
understanding that truth and beauty are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
and that the superiority of the reason-based approach to truth can be more 
effectively demonstrated through providing an aesthetically beautiful exam-
ple. From the standpoint of literary criticism, this use of beauty to indicate 
truth can also be seen mirrored within the narrative of the dialogue in So-
crates’ invocation of a physically beautiful boy as a means to elucidate the 
nature of the «transcendent form of beauty» (Kluge 2010, p. 347). It is 
through the same means that the myth functions in this context; it provides 
an appealing attraction for the reader which ultimately points the way to the 
work’s deeper philosophical truths. 
Elsewhere, Plato utilizes myths related to the afterlife in order to convey 
key philosophical points. In the Gorgias, Socrates invokes the mythological 
afterlife motif of Cronus judging the moral merit of men in a crude dichoto-
mous fashion, emphasizing the point that Zeus is said to have changed the 
nature of this judgment by requiring that both the judge and those being 
judged are stripped of their clothing and other worldly trappings (Gorgias 
523a). This appeal to myth is used to demonstrate Plato’s philosophical 
points about the unjust politics of tyrants and the unjust use of rhetoric to 
support such tyrants, as opposed to the less appetitive but ultimately more 
substantial use of philosophy (Daniels 1992, p. 271). Much later, in the Re-
public, Plato famously uses a myth entirely of his own creation, the myth of 
Er, to expound upon a similar philosophical premise: the idea that «the happy 
life is the just life» (Johnson 1999, p. 3). The use of the myth in this context 
is essential for clarifying the theme that just behavior is inherently rewarding, 
a point that would be plainly unconvincing if expressed in a purely logical 
fashion, without appeal to the beauty of the Er myth. 
In short, it is evident not only that Plato frequently uses myths in his 
philosophical writings, but also that his appeals to myth are essential. In 
many cases, these appeals made by Socrates or by Plato directly not only 
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enhance the theme or message of the work, but are critical to conveying a 
sensible understanding thereof. It is this fact, however, that makes Plato’s 
later banishment of the poetic tradition from his hypothetical republic all the 
more puzzling (v.gr. Republic 398a-b, etc.). This is especially true when one 
considers that his use of myth is not only seemingly in contradiction to his 
own statements on the merits of poetry, but also in contradiction to the cul-
tural expectations for philosophical writing during the time in which he 
lived. 
ii. mutHos in its HistoriCaL Context: tHe 6tH Century bCe
Expounding upon the use of myth in Plato’s philosophical works requires 
an in-depth understanding of the historical context of the literary tradition in 
Greece during Plato’s lifetime. There is a great deal of historical and schol-
arly evidence to suggest that an ideological shift occurred in the 6th century 
BCE, during which a deep sense of division emerged between the traditions 
of muthos and logos (Bargeliotes & Triantou 2005, p. 107). Prior to this 
point, one might observe, such as in the works of Homer and Hesiod, that 
mythic and intellectual traditions «very often … penetrate each other, in order 
to dissociate later on» (Bargeliotes & Triantou 2005, p. 107). For instance, 
one might observe the pedagogical tradition in ancient Greece of memorizing 
extensive passages from Homer. This can perhaps be viewed as being con-
nected to the status of mythology as the officially recognized state theology 
at that point in time. Whatever the case, circumstances began to change in the 
6th century, when this state endorsement of myth began to dissolve in favor 
of a greater emphasis upon empiricism and reason. 
This trend can be said to have begun with the Ionian philosophers of the 
6th century, who are credited with initiating a de-emphasizing of mythic con-
tent in literature because of myth’s apparent lack of utility as a means for 
effectively explaining the natural world (the goal of works driven by logos) 
(Bargeliotes & Triantou 2005, p. 107). As a consequence of this more ra-
tional approach to explaining the universe, philosophical works soon relegat-
ed the use of myth to a sub-function as explanatory rhetoric, and this was true 
only in the most permissive circumstances. Many philosophers in the two 
centuries before Plato condemned the use of myth outright, having «dis-
carded [it] as unworthy of him who searches for knowledge» (Edelstein 1949, 
pp. 463-464). When Plato began writing after centuries of such thinking, it 
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would have been natural for him to adopt a similar way of thinking towards 
the dichotomy between muthos and logos. 
Indeed, some of Plato’s own writings seem to indicate a stance on the 
issue that is very much in keeping with the popular prevailing opinions of 
the time. Despite the above cited use of myth in the Phaedrus to convey the 
philosophical messages of that dialogue, it also contains one of Plato’s most 
clear and direct statements on the allegorical use of myth (Phaedrus 229e-
230a): ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σχολή: τὸ δὲ αἴτιον, ὦ φίλε, τούτου 
τόδε. οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν: γελοῖον δή 
μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. «But I have no lei-
sure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as 
the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, 
when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things» (trans. H.N. 
Fowler). While it can be problematic to ascribe the views of Socrates to Pla-
to himself, this nevertheless suggests a certain reluctance of attitude towards 
the acceptance of muthos as an integral part of philosophical inquiry. Indeed, 
it seems particularly at odds with the fundamentally logos-driven Socratic 
method, save for one fact: often when Socrates appeals to a myth in these 
early dialogues, he states that while his interlocutors will view it as a false 
story, he himself regards the myth as true (see, for instance, Gorgias 523a). 
This suggests that even while preserving the contemporary view of muthos 
and logos as distinct, Plato understands that the use of muthos could subor-
dinately point to the truthful object of a logos-driven argument. 
However, such a claim brings one back to the initial point of contention: 
if Plato recognizes the instructional value of muthos, why does he decry myth 
and poetry as antithetical to learning in the Republic? Indeed, it is plain that 
Plato’s utopian view entails the denouncing of «the poetical as well as the 
mythological-religious speech, as a speech entirely impious, which obscures, 
gives false images of the gods and the heroes, excites the passions of the soul, 
diverts morals and lapses away from the area of mere truth» (Bargeliotes & 
Triantou 2005, p. 108). This concept of the elegant «mere truth» is quite 
appealing within the context of Plato’s writings, being the object of all So-
cratic inquiry, which seeks to gradually strip away all obfuscation and con-
fusion, leaving behind a singular truth supported by logos. Even contempo-
rary authors, moved by the elegance of the truth exposed by Socratic methods, 
have spoken out against the occasional Platonic appeal to myth, deeming it 
an «unbecoming habit» (Trainer 2007, p. 31). 
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Nevertheless, one cannot discount the fact that, for all his denouncing, 
Plato nevertheless does support his logical presentation of «mere truth» with 
poetry and myth. 
iii. pLato’s neW Context for mutHos 
The natural conclusion to draw from this apparent contradiction is that, even 
while Plato might have discounted the philosophical value of the myth, he 
nevertheless was «aware of the limitations of logical argument» (Edelstein 
1949, p. 464). In other words, Plato viewed the use of myth as an essential 
aspect of his duty, as an essentially Socratic philosopher, to educate those 
around him. In this sense, the function of a logical argument is severely 
limited. While a logical argument appeals to the philosopher, it is often un-
convincing, or at least less convincing, to the average person whose passion 
for pure philosophy has not yet been kindled. In this sense, it is plain to see 
why Plato would have been drawn to use myths, while also reluctant to do 
so. Indeed, as will be further explicated, in the Republic, the use of myth is 
superficially anathema to the Platonic and Socratic methods of pursuing the 
truth. For Plato, especially, who asserts the existence of Forms, myths must 
be regarded as simply another obfuscation which stands in between one’s un-
derstanding and the plain objective truth of the Form, the thing which exists. 
Nevertheless, as Plato would have been well aware of, there are some 
things which fall under the domain of philosophical discussion that cannot be 
directly perceived or experienced in a purely rational way. For example, to-
pics such as the nature of the human soul, or the nature of the further reaches 
of the cosmos, cannot be handled entirely in rationalistic terms, because 
there is no living human who has empirically experienced such phenomena. 
On these matters, one can «discourse only in pictures of imagination» (Edels-
tein 1949, p. 464). It is with this understanding that Plato’s acceptance of 
myths begins to seem more consistent with his statements on the logical 
value of said myths. 
In essence, while Plato may deride myths for existing apart from the truth, 
and in many cases, acting to obscure the truth through layers of separation 
from the Form, he still recognizes the allegorical value (if not the logical 
value) that myths can possess. Even though passages attributed to Socrates 
disparage the use of allegory, as established above, the allegorical function 
of myth was nevertheless the commonly accepted use of myth among the 
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Ionian philosophers of the 6th century BCE (Benítez 2007, p. 225). It is easy 
to see how the allegorical use, while perhaps not ideal, could still be appea-
ling to Plato, in that allegory serves to establish a more or less direct link 
between the myth itself and the object to which it refers, fulfilling a clarifying 
function rather than an obfuscating function. 
Interestingly, this concession by Plato places his use of myth in a new 
context not otherwise employed during the Ionian era, achieving something 
closer to the synthesis of muthos and logos seen in Homer and Hesiod. This 
new context can be best understood by categorizing myths and qualitatively 
distinguishing between them on the basis of content and instructive value. 
While this may seem like a major assumption to make about Plato’s methodo-
logies, one might refer to his dialogue The Sophist. In this text, a figure 
known as the Eleatic Stranger famously draws an aesthetic distinction bet-
ween what he sees as two separate types of myths: fantastic myths and eikas-
tic myths. 
The distinction between the two types of myths is made on the basis of 
aesthetic intent (Benítez 2007, p. 225). Those myths which are said to focus on 
the presentation of an aesthetically pleasing experience, through the distortion 
of actual reality (for instance, tragic plays or poetry), are regarded as fantastic 
myths. For Plato, these myths are those with the greatest likelihood of mislea-
ding people, and which have the least regard for the truth; as such, they have 
the least pedagogical value and have no place in a work of logos. These are the 
works of those poets whom Plato seeks to banish from his utopian Republic. 
By contrast, those myths which strive to accurately reproduce reality in some 
meaningful way through «employing the right perspective and accurate propor-
tions», are said to be eikastic myths (Benítez 2007, p. 225). Such myths can be 
used in a work of logos, because they serve as the aforementioned bridge bet-
ween representation and reality, rather than working to obscure reality for the 
sake of aesthetics. Plainly, if the distinction between fantastic and eikastic 
myths can be drawn on the basis of whether or not a given myth illuminates or 
obscures its reality-based referents, all of the myths utilized in the Platonic 
dialogues, as outlined above, are fundamentally eikastic in nature as they serve 
to illuminate philosophical truths rather than obscure them. 
Thus, by embracing the pedagogical utility of eikastic myths, Plato is 
better able to fulfill his own prescribed civic duty as a philosopher, and instill 
his philosophical works with a quality that is more appealing and accessible 
to the average reader, without hypocritically degrading the quality of his lo-
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gos. Plato’s use of myth, then, can be regarded not purely as an aesthetic 
choice, but rather a functional «instrument in the dialectical process» (Barge-
liotes & Triantou 2005, p. 109). Because his dialogues must often make 
considerable reference to subjects and objects that lie beyond the scope of 
direct empirical experience, it becomes necessary to provide examples of 
these things by whatever means possible; since no direct experience is pos-
sible, indirect experience through carefully constructed myths, themselves 
possessing elements that are familiar to his audience, offers the best techni-
que for expressing «whatever is inexpressible by literal language» (Bargelio-
tes & Triantou 2005, p. 109). 
A simplistic example of the use of the eikastic myth to close the gap bet-
ween mythic representation and reality can be found in the Republic, in the 
famous eikón (better for the common «allegory» as pointed out by Gilabert 
2010) of the cave. Here, Plato describes the experience of a figure chained in 
the dark and exposed only to vague and ambiguous representations of reality, 
«shadows» reflected by a fire. While the figure’s contemporaries all regard 
these shadows as the literal objective truth, the figure himself would be able to 
loosen his bonds and escape from the cave, where he discovers the actual 
Forms of reality that are casting the shadows. Within the context of this mythic 
analogy, Plato chooses to represent the concept of the supreme good as a light 
which illuminates everything in a harsh and unrelenting manner: the sun. This 
is the fundamental structure of an eikastic myth: the message is situated in a 
fictional context (a society chained inside a cave), but uses symbols and objects 
knowable to the senses (the sun) to convey truths about the nature of things that 
are not directly knowable to the senses (the idea of «supreme good»). 
Interestingly, the philosopher who escapes from the cave faces a predica-
ment remarkably similar to Plato’s own. Here is a figure who has seen and 
comprehended the Forms of reality directly, and who is sadly incapable of 
conveying these truths to his contemporaries who remain chained up in the 
cave. They dismiss his assertions as groundless flights of fancy, because they 
are so alien to their own experiences. Thus, just as Plato must struggle to 
make his logos intelligible to his untrained audience in the fulfillment of his 
civic duty as a philosopher, the figure from the eikón of the cave must also 
struggle to «make himself understandable to people who don’t possess a 
special theoretical training» (Bargeliotes & Triantou 2005, p. 110). Ultima-
tely, he is unable to convince those around him of the truth of the Forms by 
pointing to the Forms directly, because those who remain chained lack the 
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necessary faculties with which to behold the Forms; figuratively, they are 
incapable of viewing objects lit by the sun directly, because the light is too 
harsh and glaring for their sense of vision, which has been dulled by spending 
years in the dark. Rather, he must use the shadows themselves to convey his 
understanding of the truth, slowly and incrementally, in such a way that can 
be understood by those who remain chained, and it is in this context that the 
pedagogical value of myth in philosophy is laid bare: myth becomes «an 
instrument of the soul’s diversion … piloting towards the great and signifi-
cant subjects» (Bargeliotes & Triantou 2005, p. 110). The analogy to Plato’s 
own experience is plain; he cannot rely purely upon logos, or direct rational 
appeals to knowledge, because such is unintelligible to his audience; rather 
he must make use of what is intelligible, muthos, to make himself heard. In 
this sense, myths become «those shadows that show their own shadow-like 
nature», and which must work «hand in hand with dialectic» in order to pro-
duce truly effective pedagogy (Hooper 2010, p. 843). 
The epitome of this eikastic use of myth in the works of Plato occurs, 
somewhat ironically, at the end of the Republic, the very same work in which 
the philosopher calls for the banishing of poets from his utopian vision. After 
presenting an argument founded in logos for the impetus to live a just life, 
making the claim that one who lives a just life will by necessity also live the 
happiest life, Plato follows up with a self-constructed eikastic myth known 
as the «Myth of Er». This myth follows the activities of several prominent 
figures from Hellenic myth and literature as they find their way through the 
afterlife and proceed towards a form of reincarnation. Along the way, they 
encounter various scenarios in which the value of reason and just behavior is 
explicated, not only in earthly life, but in the next as well. In presenting a 
mythic counterpoint to his logos, Plato fully returns to the synthetic treatment 
of muthos and logos that was characteristic of the Hellenic tradition from 
which he borrows symbols and characters (Wang 2009, p. 282). Some critics 
have thusly regarded the myth of Er as «a philosophical rewriting of poetry» 
in which the virtues of the poetic form are fully bent to Plato’s instructive 
and pedagogical purpose (Wang 2009, p. 282). 
iv. mytH and tHe nobLe Lie 
Having determined a probable rationale for Plato’s inclusion of myth in his 
dialogues, it is still necessary to resolve the fundamental paradox between 
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this rationale and the decree that poets and myth-makers are to be banished 
from the republic, due to the harm their works do in obscuring understanding 
of the truth. One might attempt to resolve such a contradiction by an appeal to 
the fantastic and eikastic dichotomy of myth, asserting that Plato meant only 
that fantastic myths are to be abandoned, but this is not explicitly indicated 
anywhere in the text; it can only be inferred. 
The proper resolution to this seeming contradiction on the part of Plato 
lies in the fact that not all poetry and myth is banished from the republic. 
Indeed, one remains, which is to be perpetuated by the masters of the republic 
themselves: the «noble lie». In the third book of the Republic, Plato expresses 
the need for the regimented order of the republic to be maintained by means 
of a carefully calculated illusion, a «noble lie» which gives individual citi-
zens of the republic an impetus to behave justly and maintain the necessary 
order. This «noble lie» takes the form of an invented creation myth, in which 
the gods who created humanity are said to have instilled different individuals 
with one of three types of precious metal: gold for those individuals fated to 
rule the republic and hold executive offices, silver for those who defend the 
city or aid it in some fashion, and iron or brass for those who perform the 
menial tasks that nonetheless support the continuation of the republic: far-
ming, smithing, building, and so on (Republic 414e-415c). Notably, the ins-
tilling of these metallic symbols of quality is not hereditary; golden parents 
may give birth to iron or brass offspring, and vice versa. Therefore, the myth 
does not espouse fatalism, so much as a crude meritocracy wherein the me-
ritorious virtues of each individual are judged, and the individual is then 
placed in the appropriate caste accordingly, such that the tripartite order upon 
which the republic depends can be maintained. Plato asserts that the use of a 
myth to make this regimentation more comprehensible and palatable to the 
populace will make it significantly easier to maintain order by giving each 
citizen a shared reason to participate in that order (Republic, 415d). 
At first, the invocation of the noble lie might seem to only further bolster 
the idea that Plato is contradicting himself; after all, he first banishes the 
poets as dangerous to his republic, but then immediately makes personal use 
of poetry as a means to ensure the success of that republic. However, one 
must not fail to view this contradiction, as mentioned, in terms of the fantas-
tic and eikastic dichotomy. 
Indeed, one must examine not just Plato’s dismissal of the poets from the 
republic, but the three reasons he gives for doing so. In the first place, poets 
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are dismissed because their works tend to obscure rather than illuminate the 
important topics of philosophical inquiry. They serve ultimately to erect ba-
rriers before people’s understanding of the Forms, further separating them 
from reality through the process of representation distorted for aesthetic 
purposes. However, as determined above, Plato’s own use of muthos in the 
support of logos steps around this criticism by using myths that are carefully 
constructed, not so much for aesthetic appeal, as for their pedagogical value, 
their ability to accurately reveal the Forms to which they refer, particularly 
when those Forms are intangible and unable to be discerned directly with the 
senses. Certainly, the use of the noble lie falls into this category of an eikas-
tic myth; it lacks the beauty of Plato’s earlier use of myths such as in the 
Phaedrus or Timaeus, and is more directly utilitarian in its construction. 
Secondly, Plato banishes poets from the republic for the reason that poets 
have a tendency to place aesthetic emphasis only on those parts of the human 
soul which are, in Plato’s mind, least worth regarding and studying. Few are 
the poems about the beauty of truth and reason, for instance, while the appe-
titive parts of the soul are frequently depicted in poetic form, for the sake of 
aesthetic gratification. Again, however, the noble lie does not fall under the 
auspices of this criticism; in fact, it serves the eikastic function of providing 
a concrete example of the tripartite division of the soul which is directly 
analogous to the tripartite division of social classes upon which the success 
of the republic depends. 
Lastly, the banishing of the poets is justified by the tendency for poetry to 
incite inappropriate feelings of pity and sympathy in citizens, causing them 
to sympathize with those figures of poetic regard who engage in tragic self-
destruction through appetitive pursuits. This is, once again, a criticism only 
valid when applied towards fantastic mythology; it does not constitute a 
contradiction for Plato to make use of an eikastic myth such as the noble lie, 
even after an injunction to «banish all poetry». 
While one can make a valid criticism that the noble lie is a form of a 
tyranny which actually obstructs the pursuit of philosophical truth by supe-
rimposing an innate categorization of humanity which does not metaphysi-
cally exist outside the edicts of the state, the fact remains that the pedagogi-
cal virtue of the noble lie has been effectively demonstrated in various real 
world contexts outside the work of Plato. Much has been written about the 
use of the noble lie in American civic education, for instance, wherein civic 
identity is regarded as being pedagogically constructed through the forma-
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tion in the classroom of «the meaning of national identity» (Burch 2007, 
p. 111). In particular, critics have cited the use of carefully skewed historical 
narratives, themselves a form of eikastic myth, to purposively construct a 
sense of national identity similar to the «precious metals» identity which 
Plato hoped to instill; for instance, the commonly taught narrative that Co-
lumbus «discovered America» in some heroic and laudable fashion is a form 
of eikastic myth that dispenses with historical fact in order to engender a 
sense of patriotism and civic duty in the population. The control of discour-
se and narrative by the state establishes conditions wherein national identity 
is easily manipulated into serving the interests of states; as another example, 
it might be argued that the plainly constructed narratives surrounding the 
justification of the Iraq War, and the success such narratives had, regardless 
of truthfulness, at convincing the Western public of the necessity of said war. 
However, the contemporary student of Plato maintains an advantage that the 
hypothetical citizen of Plato’s republic did not: one is fully aware of the 
mythic nature of the noble lie, and as such has the capacity to critically 
evaluate the use of such lies by the state. In this way, one might judge that 
Plato’s use of the noble lie in the Republic has served an ultimately anti-
tyrannical purpose, providing the citizen with instruction in the techniques 
of authoritarian statecraft, so that these techniques might be understood, 
critiqued, and overcome. 
Ultimately, it is an excessively simplistic interpretation of Plato to say that 
his banishing poetry is a contradiction when taken in the context of his own 
use of myth. Rather than utterly devaluing poetry like some Ionian philoso-
phers, and as he himself seems to in some early dialogues, Plato openly ack-
nowledges the pedagogical function of eikastic myth and poetry. It is only 
poetry for poetry’s own sake, the creation of myths derived from purely 
aesthetic considerations, that Plato considers to be harmful to the soul and 
obstructive of learning and education. By contrast, myths which are purposi-
vely constructed to illuminate a philosophical truth are not only permissible, 
but in fact actively necessary in order to fulfill the civic duty of the philoso-
pher to improve the moral identity of the citizenry. 
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